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W001W (City Sheriff), et al.
( Conm. Atty. )

v.

/l.UJ

~

1-btion of Resporxlent to Expedite ~
Consideration of Petition for
~
Certiorari. (Also Petition for ~
Writ of Cert)
~ --7
1-btion of Respoment for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

&~ ~ ~

- ..... -

LEE (att. robbery suspect)
SUMMARY:

ry

Resp, a suspect in an attempted robbery wh:> has an allegedly

incriminatory bullet lodged in his ernst, moves for expedited review of the
~

gov~nt' s

cert petn.

On

cert, the government seeks to determine whether

the CA 4 erred in enjoining petr on Fourth Amerrlment grourxls from performing
any inwluntary surgery urxler a general anesthetic to remove a bullet lodged
one inch below resp's skin.
FlCI'S:

en

July 18, 1982 at approximately 1:00 a.m., Ralph Watkinson was

closing his store in Richmorxl, Va.
from across the street.

He noticed an armed stranger approaching

Watkinson drew his own gun and exchanged soots. Both

persons received gunsoot wourxls, am the stranger fled.

~r 4 1'\f Vltotco~ { D-(AA'f rrrf])~,·J

Watkinson called

--- -

~

-- -

the police who apprehetxied resp about eight blocks from Watkinson's store

about 20 minutes after the incident had occurred.
gunsmt woutxi to the left side of his chest.

Resp was suffering from a

Resp atxi Watkinson were

transported separately to a local mspital but were placed in the same

--------,_

emer&:._ncy room by~i_:al personnel.

When Watkinson saw resp, he exclaimed:

"'Iha.t' s the man that smt me." Resp explained to police that he had himself
been the victim of a robbery by two males wm had smt him.

After

investigating, the police determined resp 's story to be tmtrue a.txi charged him
with four felony counts •
The governnent sought to obtain the bullet from resp 's chest as

evidence.

Resp refused.

The govern:nent moved in Riclm:>nd Circuit Court to

compel production of the evidence.

At:. a hearing, a forensic scientist a.txi the

surgeon who would ranove the bullet testified that the surgery would entail
little risk of harm or injury because the bullet was believed to be only

I

one-half centimeter below the skin and could be removed with the use of local
anesthesia.

en

this testimony, the circuit court ordered the surgery.

It

stayed its order petxiing review in the Virginia S.Ct., which denied resp' s
request for a writ of prohibition.
Resp then filed a petn for a writ of habeas corpus in the DC (ED Va.) as
well as a suit utxier 42 U.S.C. §1983 in an attempt to enjoin the state from
proceeding with the surgery.

.Agreeing that resp would likely suffer no risk

of harm, the DC (Merhige) denied all relief on October 15, 1982.

----------c

Preparation began on October 18, 1982 at the Medical College of Virginia
to ranove the bullet.

Resp again protested the surgery atxi the surgeon

refused to perform the operation against resp 's will.

A secotxi surgeon was

designated, and he ordered the starx:lard pre-surgery tests.

X-rays performed

at this time daoonstrated that the bullet was much deeper in the chest wall
\....__.,

than initially believed.

Specifically, the bullet was found to be

approximately 2.5 centimeters beneath the skin.

.As a result, the new surgeon

l

decided that general anestresia, rather than local would be necessary.
When resp 's counsel was informed, he moved for rehearing in the Ricnnon:i
Circuit Court on the same day, October 18, 1982.

en

the following day, the

circuit court scheduled a hearing for October 21, 1982.

Resp 's counsel

unsuccessfully requested additional time to prepare arxl urged the court to
grant a continuaoce to permit him to obtain an irxleperxlent expert or to
develop expertise in anesthesiology prior to the court's decision.

The

circuit court denied resp 's request BIXi ordered that the surgery proceed.
Resp filed a similar mtion for a rehearing in the DC, which granted the
request BIXi allowed resp two weeks to prepare.

In the subsequent hearing,

resp presented a general surgeon woo testified about the medical risks.

After

hearing the evidence, the DC concluded that surgery tn:rler the new
circumstances--particularly the use' of general anestresia and the necessarily
greater intrusion into resp 's body--would constitute an unreasonab
~search
urxler the Fourth .Amerxlment.

llccordingly the court enjoined the state from

proceeding with the surgery an:1 issued a writ of habeas corpus.

Petr appealed

to CA 4.
CA 4 DECISIOO:
so~ht

(1)

CA 4 (Phillips, Sprouse) (Widener, dissenting} first

to determine whether the claim smuld be considered cognizable solely

urxler 42 U.S.C. §1983 or urxler 28 U.S.C §2254.

It concluded that injuoctive

relief tn:rler civil rights provisions was mre appropriate than habeas corpus.
The court reasoned that habeas is primarily a vehicle for attack by a confined

person on the legality of custody where the relief would be release.

en

the

other harxl, §1983 relief is provided to one seeking to enjoin persons acting
tn:rler color of state law from depriving a citizen of a constitutional right.
(2)

CA 4 next sought to determine wrether collateral estq>pel smuld

apply to bar the §1983 claim on the ground that it relitigates issues decided

- .... - - -

adversely to resp in the state criminal proceedings.

Q.d.ded by .Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) and Kremer v. <llemical Construction Corp., 456
U.S. 461 (1982), the CA 4 stated that it was unable to determine whether the
Virginia courts would give the earlier decisions preclusive effect.
Nevert~less,

CA 4 stated that full faith and credit is not required to be

given to the state proceedings wrere they have failed to satisfy the minimum
procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amernment.

Given the

fact that resp made several pleas for a continuance arxi that he was given
insufficient time in

t~

state court proceedings to prepare (two days), CA 4

concluded that he was denied procedural fairness.
(3)

Finally, CA 4 turned to the reasonableness of the intrusion.

CA 4

acknowledged that the controlling principles are those emmciated in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952).

Schnerber

up~ld

the admissibility of test results on blood

involuntarily rexooved from a defemant.

However, it cautioned that only minor

intrusions would be permissible, stating:
The integrity of an irrlividual 1 s person is a c~ris~d value
in our society. '!bat we today rold that the Constitution does
not forbid the States 1 minor intrusions into an irxUvidual 1 s body
umer stringently limited conditions in no way imicates that
it permits xoore substantial intrusions, or intrusions urxier
other comitions. Id. at 772.
In Rochin, the Court comemned the use of stomach-pumping to extract evidence
~e

from a suspect.
Cir. , 1976)

~

recently in United States v. Cra\\tier, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C.

bane), the Court stated that the reasonableness of removing a

bullet forcibly from a person 1 s body is judged by the extent of the surgical
intrusion am the extent of the risk to the person.
application of

t~se

intrusive because:

Id., at 316.

In

principles, CA 4 foum the proposed surgergy to be too
the bullet is lodged approximately 2.5 to 3 centimeters in

the nruscle tissue; it would require an incision of 5 centimeters to extract;

•

such surgery exposes resp to risks of injury to the IIDJscle, nerves, blood
vessels arxi other tissue, as well as increased risk of infection; the
procedure would require administration of general anestresia which includes a
probable morphine injection, as well as soditun pentathol, a barbiturate, arxi a
continuous gaseous mixture of oxygen and nitrous oxide; and surgery might last
up to two-arxi -one-half hours.

(4)

.Accordingly, CA 4 affirmed the order permanently enjoining petrs

from proceeding with tre surgery.

lbwever it vacated that portion of the OC' s

order which granted habeas relief.
CA 4 DISSENT:

In dissent, Judge Widener expressed his disapproval of

federal court intervention especially where an injunction is issued regarding
state criminal proceedings, citing Younger v. HBrrls , 401 U.S. 3 7 (1971) , and
in the abseoce of proven governnental harassment or prosecutions undertaken in
bad faith, citing Perez v. Ledesna, 401 U.S. 82 (1971).

en

the facts of this

case, Judge Widener disagreed that resp was denied a full arxi fair opportunity
to present his state case, and further disagreed that the risks atteming
surgery were too great.
CXNTENI'ICN5
two reasons.

rn

WE MERITS:

Petrs contem that cert smuld be granted for

First, petrs contem that a conflict exists between Cro-wder arxi

the present case.

In Cro-wder, the suspect had two bullets in his body:

reiOOVal of the one in the leg was forbidden as it might have caused reduction
or loss of :fuoction;

removal of tre one fran the forearm was deemed minor

surgery arxi was permitted.

The instant case presents a set of circtunstaoces

falling in between tmse in Cro-wder.

Ibwever, the CA 4 followed the Scbnerber

rule which limits intrusions to the "prick of the needle."

CXl such

interpretation, the present case is in conflict with Cro-wder.

Secorxi, petrs

contem that this Court must define the Fourth Amemment proscriptions against
unreasonable searches in this area to aid law enforcement in cases such as

-~--

-

v-

this where the bullet is one inch below the surface.

Five states and the

District of Colun:bia have authorized court-ordered surgery to reiOOVe evidence
in criminal prosecutions.

A rule of unifonnity must therefore be established

by this Court.
Resp contends that this case presents no conflict with Cro\\lder.

cited Crower with approval, but distinguished it.

The CA. 4

Moreover, the CA. 4 did not

construe Scrmerber to state that no intrusion greater than a needle is
permissible.

Simply stated, the two courts have applied the same principle to

different facts, and have reached urx:lerstandably different conclusions.
Secondly, the state cases cited by petr are distinguishable from the present
case.

l'bne of tmse cited ordered such extensive surgery under general

anesthesia as that involved here.
OJNI'ENI'IOO

rn

TilE M<JI'ICN:

Resp urges expedited consideration of the

cert petn to resolve the criminal charges that have been pending since July

1982.
DISClBSICN:

This case does not challenge whether Schnerber and Rochin

establish the proper test regarding the reasonableness urx:ler the Fourth
Amendment of intrusions into the body.

The parties do not appear to disagree

that minor intrusions into the body under stringently limited conditions do
not offerxi the Fourth Amendment.
.

7:J application of that principle.

1

~~

slightly below the

s~face

The present disagreement merely concerns

When the bullet was tho~ht to be only

of the skin and removable under local anesthesia,

the courts below were uniform in their mlding that court-ordered reiOOVal was
proper.

l

'Wl'el the bullet was later discovered to be significantly deeper, the

DC and CA. 4 majority again applied the Scltnerber test and found the intrustion

no longer to be minor.

.Accordingly, petrs were enjoined from performing the

surgery and the case is fact-specific.

Moreover, the conflict cited by petr is strained.

As reap states, the

CA 4 in the present case and the Cl:"c>Wer court simply applied tre same rule to
different facts and reacred necessarily different conclusions.
Because the uncertainty of surgery has surrouroed this lit:J.ga.tion for
nearly two years, expedited review seems warranted.
I recOIIIIleiXi that the motion to expedite be granted

am

that the petn for

cert be denied.
There is a response.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBRY M.
DAVIS, JR. v. RUDOLPH LEE, JR.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 83--1334.

Decided March-, 1984

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari.
In the early morning hours of July 18, 1982, a Richmond
storekeeper observed an armed man approaching his store.
The storekeeper drew his gun and opened fire. The approaching stranger returned the fire and during the ensuing
shoot-out, both men were hit by gunfire. Within minutes
after the shooting, Richmond police apprehended respondent
about eight blocks from the store. Respondent was suffering from a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest and was
taken to the same hospital emergency room where the storekeeper had been brought. The storekeeper, upon seeing respondent, exclaimed, "That's the man who shot me."
After respondent's explanation for the gunshot wound
proved unconvincing, he was charged with four felony counts
arising out of the attempted robbery of the storekeeper.
The Commonwealth Attorney for the c·
a motion to compel evidence to re er surgically the bullet
in respondent's chest. After sev ral hearings on the stat '
motion, at which the Richmond · ·
testimony from a forensic scientist and the surgeon who would remove the bullet, the court ruled that the bullet could be properly removed, since the surgery was a minor procedure that
would be done in a hospital under medical conditions that
would protect respondent's health. At the time the Circuit
Court made its ruling, it was believed that the bullet was
only one-half centimeter below the skin and could be removed

WI~nesthesia.

2

WINSTON v. LEE

After respondent's petitions for writs of habeas corpus and
prohibition were denied by the Virginia Supreme Court, he
i?Lf
fil~d a petition for writ of habeas cor us ~d a suit under 42
U. S. C. 1983 in federal district court to enjoin the state ~~~
fromproceeding with the surgery. The Distrfct Court ini~ 14'.¥3 ~
tially agreed with the state circuit court that the surgery pre·~
sented virtually no risk of harm to respondent and denied his
request for relief. Subsequently, a new surgeon was obtained to perform the surgery, /who determined following additional testing that the bullet was approximately 2.5 centimeters beneath the skin, somewhat deeper than mitlally
eStilliated. Because of the greater depth of tl'ie l5ulle , the
surgeon determined that general anesth~a, rather than
local anesthesia, should be usea Eo perform the surgery.
Respondent then filed a motion for rehearing in Richmond
Circuit Court, claiming that the surgery would now violate
his Fourth Amendment right against an unreasonable search.
The Richmond Circuit Co~rt ~led that the surgery could
proceed as planne ecause tller'e was no materia c ange of
circ~mstance. Respondent then filed for a new hearing on
his federal claims in District Court. The District Court con- ~
eluded that the new circumstances, especially the use of general anesthesia and e more extensive surgery, would conIf~
stitute an unreasonabie search under the -rourth
./Q....L~''
Amen ment.
51 F. upp.
, 261 (E. D. Va. 1982).
~ The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
_ J/1 ~ding of the District Court on the Fourth Amendment
C f+- WV r
issue. 717 F. 2d 888 (1983). Applying what it believed
were the controlling principles established by this Court in
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), the Court of
Appeals concluded that the proposed surgery was not the
type of minor intrusion on body sanctity authorized in
Schmerber. The court concluded that because the surgery in
this case had some potential risk and could result in trauma
or pain, the surgery constituted an unreasonable search
within the mearung of the Fourt
e

;v r/G

~

WINSTON v. LEE

3

enjoined.' Judge Widener dissented, arguing that the
record indicated that removal of the bullet was in every way
routine.
This case presents an important and recurring question
concerning the necessity for court-ordered surgery to secure
evidence relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The
lower federal courts and various state courts have spli~
widejy on whether Schmerber authorizes more inva ·
urgi al procedures to recover evidence such as a bullet. Compare nited States v. Crowder, 543 F. 2d 312 (CADC 1976)
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); Hughes v.
State, 466 A. 2d 533 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1983); State v.
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A. 2d 556 (1982); State v.
Richards, 585 S. W. 2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); and
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S. E. 2d 350 (1972), cert.
dismissed, 410 U. S. 975 (1973), with Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d
25 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510
S. W. 2d 879 (1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362
N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. 1974); and Adams v. State, 260 Ind.
663, 299 N. E. 2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 935

--------- -----

-------------------------

' The District Court had granted respondent's habeas petition and
awarded him injunctive relief on his § 1983 claim. The Court of Appeals
determined that respondent's claim was not cognizable on habeas, since his
claim related only to conditions of confinement, nottJle fact confinement
as such. The propriety of this ruling may be open to some doubt, see
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 499-500 (1973), but the issue is raised
only by respondent in his cross-petition. See Brief of Petitioner in No.
83-{)351. A more problematic aspect of the decision below is the majority's complete fai ure 0 ear witfi tne younger abstentiOn questiOns raise
by the District Court's I11Junction issued agrunst tfie state m a criminal procee mg. In t e companion cases ofYoungerv. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
and Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82 (1971),-we held that principles of federalism prevented federal courts from granting injunctive relie""f against
pending state prosecutions un ess e prosecu Ions were undertaken in bad
fai or o er ex raordin
circumstances prevailed. While the present
inJunction does not prevent the State from prosecuting respondent, I believe the injunction raises an important federalism question. The State
does not press the issue in its petition, however.

or

4
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(1974). See also State v. Allen, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (S. C.
1982). While the proposed surgery plainly presents a
greater intrusion to respondent than did the blood sampling
taken in Sch;nerb"ir, I do not believe that the reasonableness
clauseof the Fourth Amendment necessarily proscribes this
surgery. 2 We have never held that the minimal intrusions
represented by the prick of a needle or scraping of a fingernail are the outer limits beyond which the State may not go to
obtain evidence. Cf. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291 (1973);
Schmerber v. California, supra. Indeed, the record in this
case indicates that the surg_e~ <!_e~~ded~by the Stat~ is
fairly minor in character. The bullet is estimated to be less
than an rnchdeep, t e Incision to remove the bullet woulcfte
small, and the time in surgery would be, by one estimate, 20
minutes or less. The Court of Appeals, however, treated
our decision in Schmerber as the outer boundary to obtaining
evidence from a person's body. 1 woula grant certiorari in
this case to review this question and provide guidance to the
2
The Fourth Circuit in this case seemed to view Schmerber as the outer
limit to permissible medical procedures for obtainmgevuTence, but the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit employs a more flexible approach in determining whether surgery will be permitted to obtain
evidence. In United States v. Crowder, 543 F. 2d 312 (CADC 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977), the appellate court was presented with a defendant who had been shot twice, once in the thigh and once in the forearm.
The court established a four part test to determine whether surgery would
be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Under its standard, surgery was permissible if relevant evidence could be obtained no other way,
the surgery was minor and every precaution would be taken, the defendant
had an opportunity for an adversary hearing to contest the state's motion
to compel surgery, and appellate review was available prior to surgery.
Applying its test, the court determined that the bullet in the defendant's
thigh could not be removed because it posed a risk of reducing the use or
function of the defendant's leg, but the bullet in the defendant's forearm
could be removed since the surgery presented a negligible risk. A fair
reading of the standard applied in Crowder suggests that in the District of
Columbia Circuit, at least, the State's motion in this case would have been
granted.

WINSTON v. LEE
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lower courts to determine under what circumstances a court
may order surgery to recover evidence from a person.

••.•••••••••••••••••

Jiotea on .......••......•.. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced .... . ........... , 19 .. .

L.uurr;

No.

83-1334

WINSTON
vs.

LEE

Motion for leave to proceed ~· Also motion to expedite
consideration of petition for cert.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEME NT
N

POST

DI S

AFF

Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Brennan, J ................... .
White, J ... . ..... . ........... .
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Blackmun, J ................. .
Powell, J .................... .

··· v.······· ...... .
:: JV. :::::::::::::::::

Rehnquist, J ................. .
Stevens, J ................ . .......... .
O'Connor, J ........................ . . .

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ADSEN'l'

NOT VOTI NG

No. 83-1334, Winston, et al. v. Lee
Memorandum to File
This is a summary memo on the basis of a preliminary
reading of the briefs.
This is the CA 4 case involving the attempt of Virginia
authorities to obtain court approval to remove a bullet from
the shoulder of respondent Lee.

The petitioners are Winston,

Sheriff of the City of Richmond, and Aubrey Davis, Commonweath's Attorney.

Respondent is charged with attempted

robbery and wounoing of a storekeeper named Watkinson.

In a

"gun battle" between respondent and Watkinson, both were
wounded.

Petitioners obtained authority from the Circuit

Court of the City of Richmond to remove the bullet lodged
approximately one inch below the surface of respondent's skin.
Respondent -

following various proceedings that no longer

are relevant - brought this suit in federal DC to enjoin the
state from carrying out the court order to remove the bullet.
Respondent's complaint sought relief in federal habeas corpus
under §2254 and also injunctjve relief under §1983.
The DC apparently thought relief was appropriate under
both statutes (I am not sure of this), and enjoined enforcement
of the state court order.

On appeal, in a typically long

opinion by Judge Phillips, joined by Judge Sprouse, CA 4

.___
I

No. 83-1334

affirmed.

2.

It considered §2254 an inappropriate remedy as

respondent was not seeking freedom from jail where CA 4
found he properly was detained.

Rather, CA 4 construed the

complaint as alleging a violation of Fourth Amendment rights
for which §1983 afforded a proper means of injunctive relief.
Various issues were involved, the more serious of which
was whether federal courts were precluded by collateral
estoppel from reviewing the state court order.

By reasoning

that is unpersuasive to me (see dissenting opinion of Judge
Widener), CA 4 held that Allen v. McCurry did not compel
collateral estoppel because respondent had been "denied
procedural fairness" in the state courts.

As the State of

Virginia does not contest the collateral estoppel ruling,
or indeed any other procedural ruling, the only question
presented is whether removal of the bullet pursuant to a
state court order would violate respondent's Fourth Amendment
rights.

That Amendment provides, of course, that persons

shall be "secure in their persons ... against unreasonable
searches and seizures."

Thus, the question is whether the

proposed involuntary surgery would constitute an unreasonable
search of respondent's person.

3.

No. 83-1334

CA 4 correctly recognized that the primary authority is
Schmerber v. California, 384
California, 342

u.s.

u.s.

757.

Also Rochin v.

165 is relevant.

CA 4 ruled that the "basic principle" to be derived from
these cases is that:
"Once the state has demonstrated the
relevancy of evidence and the inability
to obtain it otherwise, the reasonableness
of removing it forceably from a person's
body is judged by the extent of the
surgical intrusion and the extent of the

--

risk to the person."

. Apparently the medical testimony in this case was extensive
(there were two hearings, the second revealing that the bullet
was more deeply embedded than initially thought), and the
majority view of the evidence differs quite considerably from
Judge Widener's view.

Subject to more careful consideration,

my impression is that the facts are not in dispute.

The loca-

tion of the bullet, its size, the nature of the medical procedure and the anesthesia required - all of these are not
contested.

The opinions of the physicians do differ in degree.

No. 83-1334

4.

The CA 4 majority took the gloomier picture.

It perceived

risk in cutting muscles, even when the wound is shallow.
General anesthesia was thought to entail risks, although
the great weight of medical authority - specifically with
respect to respondent - was to the contrary.

Some physicians

describe the surgery as "minor", and others apparently use
different language without characterizing it as "major".
There is a view, that makes some sense, that any "cutting"
of the body that requires general anesthesia is not minor.
It is not easy for me to identify the legal question in
this case.

The brief on behalf of the state is poorly

written, apparently without help from the Attorney General's
Office.

It argues that CA 4 has adopted a "per se" rule to

the effect that "all intrusions into the human body are
per se unconstitutional".
\

Br. p. 8, et seq.

I do not read CA 4's opinion as adopting any such rule,

although it does read Schmerber very narrowly.
This is another case we should not have taken.

The more

importa.nt issue - at least for me - is whether CA 4 erred in
its denial of collateral estoppel.

I would think that a

strong persumption exists that where a state court has acted
in a case of this kind, a federal court should not intervene
except in circumstances far clearer than those that exist in
this case.

There had been hearings and proceedings in the

No. 83-1334

5.

state courts that Judge Widener thought were entirely consistent with due process.
issue.

But the state did not appeal this

Perhaps we can clarify Schmerber, but this probably

is not necessary.

Case appears to involve only opinions as

to the seriousness of the intrusion (the cutting) and the
risk of a general anesthetic.

(As I have had this in six

major operations, the risk is not as great as driving auto
under certain conditions).
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1
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Question Presented

Whether
malicious

wounding

from

shoulder

his

violates

the

unreasonable
located

requiring
to
to

Fourth
searches

approximately

a

undergo
be

defendant

as

Amendment's
of
one

the

person,

inch

with

----------------

surgery

used

charged

to

remove

evidence

a

against

proscription
when

beneath

the

the

bullet
him

against
bullet

skin,

is

general

anesthesia will be required during the surgery, the incision
will be approximately

5 centimeters long,

and

the surgery

will be done in a hospital, in a case in which the State has
proved probable cause exists to believe the bullet is there
and the defendant had an adversary hearing before a neutral
judge and an opportunity for appellate review?

I. Background

A. Facts and Decisions Below
Shortly
Watkinson,
business

a

the

night

him.

exchanged fire.
body,

in

when

on

July

Richmond,
he

18,

1982,

was

observed

an

Ralph

closing
armed

Watkinson drew his own gun and

his

gunman
the

two

The gunman was hit in the left side of his

and Watkinson

fled.

midnight

storekeeper

for

approaching

after

Police

was wounded

transported

in both

Watkinson

to

legs.
a

The gunman

local

emergency

room; another police car in the area of the store responded
to a call for resp, who had suffered a gunshot wound in the
left chest-shoulder area.

By chance, resp was taken to the
~ --

same

-------

emergency

room

as

Watkinson,

whereupon

the man that shot me!"

Watkinson

Resp reported to

police that he had been shot after being robbed by two men,
but police investigated the story and found it to be
Resp was
four felony counts:
an

attempted

firearm

subsequently

and

charged

with

attempted robbery, use of a firearm in

robbery,

in such a

arrested

untrue. ~

malicious

wounding.

The

wounding,
State

and

filed

use

of

a

a motion to

•.

compel

evidence,

seeking

to

have

the

bullet

in

resp's

shoulder removed to determine whether it had been fired from
Watkinson's gun.
There
which

resp

followed

was

a

series of court proceedings,

represented

by

counsel

throughout.

in

After

/

hearings,

the Va. circuit court granted the State's motion

to compel, finding that surgery to remove the bullet did not
violate

the

search of

Fourth Amendment as

the person,

an unreasonably

intrusive

because the bullet was located one-

half centimeter below the skin and the procedure to remove
requir~l

it would be minor,

~a.S.Ct.

federal~C

affirmed, and the

anesthetic.

The

denied resp's requests

for a writ of habeas corpus and for relief under §1983.
Resp was taken to the hospital to have the surgery
performed.

During

taken

revealed

that

originally

been

decided that
be used.

the course of preparation,
that

the

thought,

and

bullet

was

x-rays were

deeper

than

~

the

surgeon

had

consequently

general anesthesia, instead of a local, should

Resp's counsel then returned to the circuit court

requesting a rehearing based on changed circumstances.
After

-(~

to

taking

its

prior

additional..........- evidence,

ruling.

The

va.S.ct.

the

affirmed,

resp moved again in DC for habeas or §1983 relief.
..:.--

court

--~

the

change

in

circumstances

was

material

After a

and

that

permitting the surgery would deny resp his Fourth Amendment
right

against

unreasonable

intrusions of

his person.

~

and~!

hearing, the DC (Merhige) granted the relief sought, holding
that

:2. __...-{- • ~ /)

CA4

,/
substantially

affirmed

(Phillips

and

Sprouse),

with

Judge

Widener dissenting.l

B. Relevant Case Law
~
In Schmerber v.

California,

384

u.s.

757

(1966),

the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by
the

nonconsensual

determine

blood

withdrawal

alcohol

level

of

a

for

purposes

charges based on drunken driving.

person's

blood

of

to

resolving

The Court noted that for

an intrusion beyond the surface of the skin to be reasonable
under

the

Fourth

there

Amendment,

must

be

a

"clear

indication" that it would produce the evidence desired and
that

the

stressed

evidence was
the

deliberate"

not obtainable otherwise;

importance

of

an

"informed,

determination of probable cause.

the Court

detached,
Id.,

at

and
770.

The Court's decision to permit the extraction of blood was
premised
effective

in part on

the facts

that such a

in accurately producing

the

test

is highly

evidence needed

for

conviction; that the procedure for extraction is commonplace
and involves "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain"; and that

1 cA4 concluded that habeas relief was not appropriate

because resp was not challeng i ng~~ cond1 ti o n s of his
custody.
It therefore dismissed the DC's grant of the
habeas writ.
It ruled that resp was entitled tg_ § l2 83
.........
relief, however, and ~ that he was ~ot_ collaterally estopped ~ l)u,f ~
trom raising th issue by the sta t e courts' reso f ution of
the 1ssu ag 1nst 1m bec ~ s ~ he had not received a full and
~fair hearing there. The S ~ te does not appeal this issue
~. ~
here.
(J--~

Cf

it was performed in a reasonable manner--by a doctor,
hospital

setting,

according

to

accepted

medical

in a

practices

that would minimize the risk of injury or infection to the
defendant.

Id.,

at

771.

The Court's holding was narrow:

----.

it ruled only that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
"minor intrusions under stringently limited conditions"; it
left

open

the

intrusions

or

question

intrusions

constitutional.

of

whether

under

other

more

substantial

conditions

would

be

Id., at 772.

The other major decision of this Court involving
the

constitutionality

consent

of

evidence

the

was

of

a

defendant

~chin

v.

bodily
for

intrusion

the

California,

purpose
342

against
of

u.s.

procuring

165

(1952).

a..

violated by the actions of police in unlawfully entering
and

bedroom;

defendant's
assaulting

attempting

mouth
and

after
battering

his ~

to remove capsules from the

observing
him

him

in

swallow

the

process;

them,
and

transporting him to a hospital against his will to have his
stomach pumped

and

the capsules thus revealed.

did

its

decision

not

base

on

Fourth

Amendment

The Court
grounds,

however, but on the fact that the searches and seizures had
been conducted without either a warrant or consent and that
the entire course of events was so shocking as to violate
defendant's rights to due process of law.
Although quite a

11.61

been ~~

There, the Court ruled that the defendant's rights had

house

the

Id., at 172.

few state courts have addressed

the question, only one CA besides the court below has ruled

C:.~

on the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment of surgery
to

remove

a

bullet

United States v.
denied,

defendant

Crowder,

u.s.

429
in

a

needed

1069

for

case

In

that

case,

(CADC 1976) ,

cer t.

--

543 F. 2d 312

(1967),

murder

evidence.

CADC ruled en bane that the

had

not

--:::::::r

been deprived

of

his

Fourth Amendment rights by the surgical removal of a bullet
------------·~

located just under the skin of his arm, to produce evidence

..._____

~· --......-.~

-' --

that would show he had been shot by the same gun used to
kill the murder victim.

The court based its decision on the

following

factors:

otherwise

unobtainable,

believe

the

(1)

surgery

that
and

would

the
there

produce

evidence

was

relevant,

was

probable

the

evidence:

cause

to

(2)

the

.
,
operation
was / minor
an d performed b y a s k'Illed surgeon un d er

circumstances in which all possible medical precautions had
~
been taken so that the risks to the defendant were minimal:

( 3)

-

.
the defendant had a v pre-operation adversary h ear Ing
at

which he was represented by counsel: and

(4)

the defendant

was given a chance for appellate review before the operation
was performed.
just

under

The DC had ruled that the bullet was located

the

skin

of

the

arm,

that

removal

would

not

affect any nerves, and that the operation could be performed
._./'

using a local anesthetic:
bullet

located

in

the

the same was not true of another

defendant's

thigh,

because

it

was

lodged more deeply and the DC had found that removal might
impair

the

majority's

leg's

function.

holding,

in

part

A dissent
because

disagreed
it

with

contended

the
that

procuring the bullet and finding that it was fired from the

..
.

.

murder

weapon

could

have

proved

no

more

than

that

the

defendant was present at the scene of the crime, a fact that
was not disputed at trial.

II. Discussion

As you noted in your memo to the file,

the legal

------...,

question in this case is very difficult to pin down.

State

cases following Schmerber, as well as the CADC, all view the

~fc~

issue

of

the

reasonableness

depending on the

of

a

bodily

as ~

intrusion

such as how deep th ~~,4

facts of each case,

incision must be, how close the bullet is to vital organs,

~

whether a general or local anesthetic is required, and what

~

are the foreseeable risks of trauma to the defendant.
removal

of

procedure
surgeon

a

bullet

than
in

a

a

is

blood

hospital

an

inherently

test,

requiring

more
the

Thus,

setting.

The

complicated

services of

detailed

a

advance

planning is required in these cases, and rarely at issue are
the

factors

that

Schmerber

was

most

concerned

about:

whether probable cause exists to believe that the procedure
will produce the item of evidence desired: whether probable
cause

has

been

determined

by

a

neutral

and

detached

magistrate: and whether the procedure will be performed in a
reasonable
accepted

manner--by
medical

variable nature of
each case,

and

a

doctor,

practices.
the factors

in

a

Because

hospital,
of

the

observing
infinitely

that must be considered

the consequent difficulty

in formulating

in
a

./1w.

general

rule

of

law,

the

Court

granted cert in this case.

should

probably

not

u.k

~

have

~

Since the case is here, however,

~~

...

the Court must decide whether this particular 1ntrus1on 1s

;_.n

,J?Y~~
~

reasonable.
In another Fourth Amendment context, the Court has
stated

the

particular
its

general

truth

that

"the

permissibility
u

of

__

a

law enforcement practice is judged by .....___
balancing

intrusion on

the

individual's

Fourth Amendment

\'

~

rights

against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests."

~elaware

v. Prouse, 440

u.s.

648, 654 (1979).

Applying that

standard here, it is clear that an accused, who has not yet
been

convicted

of

a

crime,

has

a

great

interest

in

not ,a.,,L~

lightly being compelled to submit to general anesthesia and

the

State

has

a compelling governmental

interest

in~

prosecuting crimes of the sort in which it believes resp was
involved.
be

to

A useful way to analyze this case, therefore, may

look

surgery

and

first
its

at

the

impact

circumstances

upon

examination of the State's

the

relevant

resp,

interest

in,

followed

and

to
by

need for,

the
an
the

evidence that could be revealed by the surgery.

A. The Surgery and Its Impact
In
sweeping

Schmerber,

statements

the

about

Court

the

declined

outer

limits

to

make

any

of

what

the

Fourth Amendment permits in the area of bodily intrusions.
In permitting

the blood test,

·'

however,

c~

On the other · ~

a more than superficial surgery upon his body.
hand,

?~

it did rely on the

facts

that

virtually
proof

the
no

that

test

risk,
the

is

commonplace

trauma,

surgery

or

and

pain.

requested

by

that

it

involves

Resp cites

this

as

the

here

is

State

unconstitutional.
There
here

is

no

question

that

involves considerably more

the

risk,

surgery

trauma,

required

and pain to

the patient than did the blood test in Schmerber.
read Schmerber,

however,

as requiring

I do not

the conclusion that

this surgery is an unconstitutional intrusion.

Even though

the Court cautioned there that greater intrusions might not
be constitutional,

it carefully stated that it reached its

judgment "only on the facts of the present record," and that
it

held

States

only
minor

stringently
Court

"that

did

the

intrusions
limited

not

Constitution
into

an

to

not

individual's

conditions,"

purport

does

u.s.,

384

decide

the

forbid
body

at

the

under

772.

The

constitutionality of

other types of intrusions under other circumstances.

Here,

as in Schmerber, the conditions under which the surgery will
be

performed

operation

will

will

be

be

"stringently

performed

by

a

limited"
doctor,

pursuant to standard medical practices.

in

in a

that

the

hospital,

The only question ~

remaining as to the proposed surgery, therefore, is

wheth~

l--7,.., ~-

it is so major that it violates the Fourth Amendment. That~~
~~

question is not answered by Schmerber.
Analogies

to other

Fourth

Amendment cases

from

this Court are also unhelpful, as the Schmerber Court noted,
see id.,

at

769,

because

intrusions beyond

the surface of

-- ·--------

the skin involve concerns of privacy and human dignity that
~----

·--=:._

- - ----

are not implicated by the more usual searches of the person.
Petr and resp each analyze the relevant state court cases
and attempt to draw from them some overriding principle that
will

determine

discussed

when

above,

an

intrusion

however,

such

becomes
an

too

great.

overriding

As

principle

cannot exist because the reasonableness of an intrusion will
vary

infinitely

and

materially

from

case

to

case.

Even

cases of a particular category of intrusion, such as those
involving

the

surgical

removal

of

a

bullet,

do

not

lend

themselves to a more manageable standard because the depth
of the bullet, its proximity to vital organs, the health of
the defendant, and other such crucial facts cannot either be
predicted or categorized.
CA4

and

the

DC

determination of

whether

"minor"

the

under

attempt
a

to

separate

particular

circumstances,.

type

of

from

the

medical

surgery
the

is

legal

determination of whether the surgery is minor enough to be
constitutionally
App. at 43.)

permissible.

(See

CA4's

decision,

Petn

Those courts are correct to the extent that a

medical determination of that sort is, of course, not made
with a constitutional standard in mind.
however,

once a court concludes

(1)

By the same token,

that the proper

legal

precautions of ensuring that probable cause exists and that
the deft has had an adversary hearing and appellate review
have been taken, and

(2)

~
~
question cg

that the surgery will be conducted

in a reasonable and medically safe manner, the only

remaining

is

the determination of how relatively major or

minor the intrusion will be.
decison

must

bear

the

Although a court making this

Fourth

Amendment

in

mind,

it

may

properly consider the question only after being informed of
the

medical

evaluation

procedure
will be.
r--- __ .
putting aside as

of

how

risky

or

traumatic

the

Thus, I believe CA4 and the DC erred in
irrelevant the medical determination that

the surgery is "minor."

B. The State's Interest in the Evidence
In analysing the State's need for the evidence to
accomplish its governmental purpose of bringing a felon to
justice,

it

is

Schmerber.

somewhat

One

permitting
effective

the
in

of

helpful

the

blood

primary

test was

producing

conviction:

the

the

once
reasons

blood

to

given

that such a

evidence

defendant's

again

there

test

that

is

look

for

is highly
needed

alcohol

at

level.

for

By

comparison, in this case the same degree of effectiveness is
lacking,
surgery

because
would

although

produce

there

the

is

no

bullet,

question

there

is

that

the

substantial

question whether the evidence needed for conviction could be
deduced from tests on the bullet after it was removed.
State

does

not

tests

are

sufficiently

impossible

to

contest

tell

unreliable

gun--even

~

perfect shape.

contention

from examining

______Watkinson's

fired
,._ from

resp' s

Moreover,

that

that
it

the bullet
if

the

The

ballistics

may
that

bullet

well

be

it was
were

in

there is considerable doubt here

about what the bullet's condition is,

because

it may have

been damaged by entry or by having been exposed for over two
years to the apparently corrosive effect of bodily fluids.
Therefore,

__

production
of
the bullet
'----_____,____--__ ........

may _......._____._
be far__

from

-

~~~~vi/§

conclusive _as to resp's guilt.
- -- '--"-----....___-~

I

·~ ~~~ ~-

Furthermore, casting additional doubt on the value
of

the bullet as evidence

what

is the fact

that the SJ: ate _has

is evidently a competent eyewitness identification of

resp made by Watkinson shortly after the shooting occurred.
Therefore,

even

assuming

that

examination

of

the

would reveal that it came from Watkinson's gun,

bullet

that piece

of evidence may well be unnecessary to convict resp.
The Schmerber
human

dignity

protects

and

forbid

Court held that "[t]he interests in

privacy
such

Fourth

chance that desired evidence might be obtained."

384

u.s.,

at

might

added) •

construed as requiring,
the

bullet

exists

I

light

of

of

- -

the

facts

------------ - -

Although

on

this

be

in this case, only a certainty that

and

surgical procedure,

intrusion

Amendment
mere

(emphasis

[bodily]

the

the

760-770

any

which

may

be

obtained

by

believe a better way to
Schmerber,

is

to

the

proposed

rea~

require

it,

that

in

t~ ~-f

~

evidence be needed for conviction, as was the blood test in
Schmerber,

and

that there be a

reasonable chance that

~

~

t~&.4
~

evidence needed for conviction will be obtained by employing ~
the procedure.

Here, the State should be required to show a

reasonable likelihood that tests will demonstrate that the

~

bullet was fired from Watkinson's gun, not just a likelihood
that the bullet exists.

c.

Weighing Both Sides of the Question
In the end, the Court must simply weigh all of the

factors supporting the State's need for the evidence versus
the complexity of

the procedure and

its risk to the resp,

and make a judgment about the reasonableness of the surgery.
Recognizing
yours,
is

not

that

my

judgment

may

very

well

differ

from

I conclude on balance that the surgery proposed here
reasonable

under

the

Fourth

Although

Amendment.

----------------------------------~--------~-there
are
always
some
risks
involved
with
anesthesia,

certainly the

resp

general

is an unusually good risk,

given his previous successful exposure to such anesthetics
and his youth and good health.

The incision required is a

fairly deep one, more than the superficial incision involved

..........-----

in Crowder or

the pinprick

risk of damage
the

general

the

chance

in Schmerber;

to nerves and muscles.

anesthetic
that

any

apparently

such

damage

it involves some

On the other hand,

substantially
will

occur,

decreases

because

the

muscles will be relaxed. Also in favor of a conclusion that
the intrusion is reasonable is the fact that the bullet is
located

near

considerations

no

vital

alone,

organs.
the

case

Based
is

on

close,

these
but

medical )
I

would

probably lean toward a conclusion that the operation was not
unduly intrusive.
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~~~~~~
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~~~
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In

the

end,

however,

I

am

persuaded

that

this

C--~

--------

operation should not be permitted because the State has not
~

----

_,

-

demonstrated that removal of the bullet would be likely to
-----------------------~--~--~--------------enable it to obtain a conviction it would not otherwise be

---

able

to obtain.

As

noted

above,

the

competent and convincing eyewitness
by Watkinson.

State already has a

identification of resp

Moreover, there is a substantial chance that

tests on the bullet will be inconclusive as to whether the
bullet

was

factors

fired

is,

for

conclusion

that

from
me,

Watkinson's

enough

to

requiring

shift

the

Weighing

gun.
the

balance

these
to

a
be

would

operation

unreasonable.

Conclusion

Because

the question of

the

reasonableness of

a

bodily intrusion by Fourth Amendment standards necessarily
depends on the facts of each case, and because the facts of
these cases are so infinitely variable,

---

it is d iff icul t

to

ascertain an overriding legal principle that will apply
~------------------~-------------across the board. Schmerbe ~ provides some help, although it
is not dispositive, because the Court there strictly limited
"""'-------\
Looking to the general
its judgment to the case's facts.
principle of Fourth Amendment law that the permissibility of
a

law enforcement procedure

the

intrusion

legitimate

.'

to

the

governmental

should be

person

against

interests,

I

judged by balancing
its

promotion

conclude

that

of
the

proposed
Amendment.

surgery

in

The

this

medical

case

would

procedures

violate
alone

the

Fourth

present

a

substantial intrusion, but not one that I would consider to
be unreasonable.

Combined with the likelihood that tests on

the bullet would be inconclusive as to resp's guilt and the
lack

of

need

identification

for
of

those
resp

as

tests,
the

given

the

assailant,

balance tips against permitting the surgery.
recommend that you vote to affirm.
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 17, 1985

Re:

83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill:
My reaction to your draft was pretty much the
same as that expressed by Sandra. Moreover, in this
particular case I was strongly influenced by my
belief that the prosecutor really doesn't need the
bullet anyway. For the time being, therefore, I
shall also await other reactions.
Sincerely,

y

./1----

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

January 17, 1985

No. 83-1334

Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill,
At Conference, I voted to affirm in this case, but
your sweeping approach to it gives me pause. I had thought
Schmerber gave us all the tests and guidelines we needed to
balance the state's interest against those of the defendant
;on the facts of this case. Your draft appears to adopt a
~ new strict four-part test, including an adversarial
proceeding and appellate review, in every instance of any
violation of a person's bodily integrity. I am unwilling to
follow more than a reasonable balancing approach, taking
into account the crucial factors in this particular case.
Moreover, I am also concerned with the apparent expansion of
the characterization of the Fourth Amendment protections as
outlined in Part II of the opinion.
For now, I will wait for possible further writing.
Failing that, I plan to write something concurring in the
judgment.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS 01'"

.JUSTICE

w ...

.J. BRENNAN, .JR.

January 18, 1985

No. 83-1334
Winston v. Lee

Dear Sandra,
I will be circulating a revised
draft that I hope will accommodate you.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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tift }tnitta .UdtS'
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C HAMB E R S OF"

..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

January 24, 1985

83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill,
I doubt that I can join your opinion in
its present form and will very likely concur
on much narrower grounds.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell ./
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Brennan

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1334

ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBREY
M. DAVIS, JR., PETITIONERS v.
RUDOLPH LEE, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[February -

, 1985]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held inter
alia that a State may, over the suspect's protest, have a physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving
without violation of the suspect's right secured by the Fourth
Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, Schmerber cautioned "That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions."
I d., at 772. In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia
seeks to compel the respondent Rudolph Lee, who is suspected of attempting to commit armed robbery, to undergo a
surgical procedure under a general anesthetic for removal of
a bullet lodged in his chest. The Commonwealth alleges that
the bullet will provide evidence of respondent's guilt or innocence. We conclude that the procedure sought here is an example of the "more substantial intrusion" cautioned against in
Schmerber, and -eeas9qUQRtl~ hold that to permit the procedure would violate respondent's right to be "secure in [his]
person" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
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WINSTON v. LEE

I
A
At approximately 1:00 a. m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph E.
Watkinson was closing his shop for the night. As he was
locking the door, he observed someone armed with a gun
coming toward him from across tbe street. Watkinson was
also armed and when he drew his gun, the other person told
him to freeze. Watkinson then fired at the other person,
who returned his fire. Watkinson was hit in the legs, while
the other individual, who appeared to be wounded in his left
side, ran from the scene. The police arrived on the scene
shortly thereafter, and .Watkinson was taken by ambulance
to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia
(MCV) Hospital.
Approximately 20 minutes later, police officers responding
to another call found respondent eight blocks from where the
earlier shooting occurred. Respondent was suffering from a
gunshot wound to his left chest area and told the police that
he had been shot when two individuals attempted to rob him.
An ambulance took respondent to the MCV Hospital.
Watkinson was still in the MCV emergency room and, when
respondent entered that room, said "[T]hat's the man that
shot me." App. 14. After an investigation, the police
decided that respondent's story of having been himself the
victim of a robbery was untrue and charged respondent with
attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of
using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
B
The Commonwealth shortly thereafter moved in State
court for an order directing respondent to undergo surgery to
remove an object thought to be a bullet lodged under his left
collarbone. The court conducted several evidentiary hearings on the motion. At the first hearing, the Commonwealth's expert testified that the surgical procedure would
take 45 minutes and would involve a three to four percent
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chance of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of
permanent nerve damage, and a one-tenth of one percent
chance of death. At the second hearing, the expert testified
that on re-examination of respondent, he discovered that the
bullet was not "back inside close to the arteries," App. 52, as
he originally had thought. Instead, he now believed the bullet to be located "just beneath the skin." App. 57. He testified that the surgery would require an incision of only one
and one-half centimeters (slightly more than one-half inch),
could be performed under local anesthesia, and would result
in "no danger on the basis that there's no general anesthesia
employed." App. 51.
The state trial judge granted the motion to compel surgery. Respondent petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court
for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of habeas corpus, both
of which were denied. Respondent then brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to enjoin the pending operation on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court refused to issue a preliminary injunction, holding that respondent's cause had little likelihood
of success on the merits. 551 F. Supp. 247, 247-253 (1982). 1
On October 18, 1982, just before the surgery was scheduled, the surgeon ordered that X-rays be taken of respondent's chest. The X-rays revealed that the bullet was in fact
lodged two and one-half to three centimeters (approximately
one inch) deep in muscular tissue in respondent's chest, substantially deeper than had been thought when the state court
granted the motion to compel surgery. The surgeon now believed that a general anesthetic would be desirable for medical reasons.
' Respondent's action in the District Court was styled as a petition for
habeas corpus and an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a preliminary injunction. Because the District Court denied the relief sought, it found it
unnecessary to consider whether res judicata, see Allen v. McCurry, 449
U. S. 90 (1980), would bar consideration of the§ 1983 claim. 551 F. Supp.,
at 252, n. 4.
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Respondent moved the state trial court for a rehearing
based on the new evidence. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the state trial court denied the rehearing and the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then returned to federal court, where he moved to alter or amend
the judgment previously entered against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court enjoined the threatened
surgery. 551 F. Supp. 247, 253-261 (ED Va. 1982) (supplemental opinion). 2 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 717 F. 2d 888 (1984). 3 We
2

Respondent had moved to reopen the petition for habeas corpus, as
well as to alter or amend the judgment. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
petition for habeas on the ground that respondent was not at that time "in
custody" for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The District Court rejected
this contention, holding that habeas was available because petitioner was
objecting to a future custody that would take place when the operation was
to be performed. 247 F. Supp., at 257-259. The Court of Appeals held
that respondent's claim was cognizable only under § 1983. 717 F . 2d, at
893 (1983). Respondent has not cross-petitioned for review of this holding, and it is therefore not before us.
3
The Fourth Circuit held that Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980),
did not bar respondent's attempt to relitigate in federal court the same
Fourth Amendment issues previously litigated in state court. The court
agreed with the District Court's conclusion, see 551 F . Supp., at 258-259,
that respondent had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the
state trial court. 717 F. 2d, at 895-899. Respondent filed his motion for
rehearing in state court on October 18, the day he was informed of the
changed circumstances regarding the removal of the bullet. On October
19, the state court ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held on October 21.
The Court of Appeals was "satisfied from the record that counsel was not
able, despite obviously diligent effort, to obtain an independent review of
the medical record by outside physicians nor was he able to consult with
the independent expert in anesthesiology in order to prepare a presentation on the risks of general anesthesia." !d., at 897. Yet, despite the crucial nature of the medical evidence, the state court refused to grant
respondent's repeated request for a continuance. Because "[t]he arbitrary
truncation of preparation time deprived [respondent] of a fair opportunity
to determine the crucial factors relevant to his claim and to obtain independent expert witnesses to testify about these factors," 717 F . 2d, at
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granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), to consider
whether a State may consistently with the Fourth Amendment compel a suspect to undergo surgery of this kind in a
search for evidence of a crime.
II
The Fourth Amendment protects "expectations of privacy," see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1968)-the
individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places and
at certain times he has "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Putting to one side the
procedural protections of the warrant requirement, the
Fourth Amendment generally protects the "security" of "persons, houses, papers and effects" against official intrusions up
to the point where the community's need for evidence surmounts a specified standard, ordinarily "probable cause."
Beyond this point, it is ordinarily justifiable for the community to demand that the individual give up some part of his
interest in privacy and security to advance the communit 's
vital interests in law enforcement; such ~s generally
"reasonable" in the Amendment's terms.
A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privac and
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may e "unreasonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime. Cf.
Tennessee v. Garner,-- U.S.--,-- (1985) (holding
that "seizure" by means of deadly force may not be justifiable
despite the presence of probable cause sufficient to permit
arrest). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966),
we addressed a claim that the State had breached the Fourth
Amendment's protection of the "right of the people to be
secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches
898-899, the Court of Appeals refused to grant preclusive effect to the
state court's findings. Petitioner does not challenge this ruling.
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and seizures" (emphasis added) when it compelled an individual suspected of drunk driving to undergo a blood test.
Schmerber had been arrested at a hospital while receiving
treatment for injuries suffered when the automobile he was
driving struck a tree. Id., at 758. Despite Schmerber's
objection, a police officer at the hospital had directed a physician to take a blood sample from him. Schmerber subsequently objected to the introduction at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the blood test.
The authorities in Schmerber clearly had probable cause to
~
~
believe that~ had been driving while intoxicated, id., at
L~
768, and to believe that a blood test would provide evidence
that was exceptionally probative in confirming this belief.
I d., at 770. Because the case fell within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant
was necessary. Id. The search was not more intrusive
than reasonably necessary to accomplish its goals. Nonetheless, Schmerber argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the authorities from intruding into his body to extract
the blood that was needed as evidence.
Schmerber noted that "[t]he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." I d., at
767. Citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949), and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we observed that these
values were "basic to a free society." We also noted that
"[b]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the human
body rather than with state interferences with property rela~ _ ti~nships or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects'~
we wrjte on a clean slate." 384 U. S., at 767-768. The intrusion perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and
deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis thus required a discerning inquiry into the facts and circumstances to determine
whether the intrusion was justifiable. The Fourth Amendment neither forbids nor permits all such intrusions; rather,

-

-,h.J...
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the Amendment's "proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against those intrusions
which are not· justified in the circumstances, or which are
made in an improper manner." /d., at 768.
The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case,
the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate
one admitting of few categorical answers. We believe that
Schmerber, however, provides the appropriate framework of
analysis for such cases.
Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of
the Fourth Amendment would be the threshold requirements
for conducting this kind of surgical search and seizure. We
noted the importance of probable cause. Id., at 768-769.
And we pointed out that "[s]earch warrants are ordinarily
required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the
human body are concerned .... The importance of informed,
detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether
or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt
is indisputable and great." I d., at 770.
Beyond these standards, Schmerbers inquiry considered a
number of other factors in determining the "reasonableness"
of the blood test. A crucial factor in analyzing the rna itude of the intrusion in Schmerber. t e extent to which the
procedure may threaten the safet or health of the individual. "[F]or most people [a blood test] involves virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain." Ibid. Moreover, all reasonable
medical precautions were taken and no unusual or untested
procedures were employed in Schmerber; "the procedure was
performed by medical technicians in a hospital environment
according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. Notwithstanding the existence of probable cause, a search for evi-
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dence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life
or health of the suspect. 4
Another factor is the extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity. Intruding into an individual's living room, see Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), eavesdropping upon an
individual's telephone conversations, see Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1968), or forcing an individual to
accompany police officers to the police station, see Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), typically do not injure the
physical person of the individual. Such intrusions do, however, damage the individual's sense of personal privacy and
security and are thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's
dictates. In noting that a blood test was "a commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examinations," 384 U. S., at
771, Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an
individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 5
'Numerous courts have recognized the crucial importance of this factor.
See, e. g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S. W. 2d 879, 882 (1974)
(refusing to order surgery because of medical risk); People v. Smith, 80
Misc. 2d 210, 362 N. Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (same); State v. Allen, 277
S. C. 595, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (1982) (same); see also Lee v. Winston, 717 F .
2d 888, 900 (CA4 1983); id., at 905-908 (Widener, J ., dissenting); United
States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 312, 316 (1976)
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551
S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 1977) (en bane). See generally Note, 68 Marquette
L. Rev. 130, 135 (1984) (discussing cases involving bodily intrusions); Note,
60 Notre Dame Law Review 149, 152-156 (1984) (same); Note, 55 Texas L.
Rev. 147 (1976) (same).
5
See also Sehmerber, 384 U.S, at 771 ("The blood test has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military
service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have
voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer, routine in becoming
blood donors") (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957)).
The degree of intrusion in Sehmerber was minimized as well by the fact
that a blood test "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," 384 U. S., at
771, and by the fact that the blood test was conducted "in a hospital envi-
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Weighed against these individual interests is the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or
innocence. This interest is of course of great importance.
We noted in Schmerber that a blood test is "a highly effective
means of determining the degree to which a person is under
the influence of alcohol." !d., at 771. Moreover, there was
"a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence [would]
be found" if the blood test were undertaken. I d., at 770.
Especially given the difficulty of proving drunkenness by
other means, these considerations showed that results of the
blood test were of vital importance if the State were to enforce its drunk driving laws. In Schmerber, we concluded
that this State interest was sufficient to justify the intrusion,
and the compelled blood test was thus "reasonable" for
Fourth Amendment purposes.

III
Applying the Schmerber balancin,g test in this case, we believe that the Court of Appears reacl?e(f the correct result.
The Commonwealth plainly had probable cause to conduct
the search. In addition, all parties apparently agree that
respondent has had a full measure of procedural protections
and has been able fully to litigate the difficult medical and
legal questions necessarily involved in analyzing the reasonableness of a surgical incision of this magnitude. 6 Our
ronment according to accepted medical practices." I d. As such, the procedure in Schmerber contrasted sharply with the practice in Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165 (date), in which police officers broke into a suspect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put into his
mouth, took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be administered
to induce vomiting. Id., at 166. Rochin, recognizing the individual's interest in "human dignity," id., at 174, held the search and seizure unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.
6
Because the State has afforded respondent the benefit of a full adversary presentation and appellate review, we do not reach the question
whether the State may compel a suspect to undergo a surgical search of
this magnitude for evidence absent such special procedural protections.
Cf. United States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d

..
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inquiry therefore must ~s OE_t!!e ex~t o!Jhj "ntrusion on
respondent's privacy interestSarra-orltliestate need for the
evidence.
The threats to the health or safety of respondent posed by
the surgery are the subject of sharp dispute between the parties. Before the new revelations of October 18, the District
Court found that the procedure could be carried out "with
virtually no risk to [respondent]." 551 F. Supp., at 252. On
rehearing, however, with new evidence before it, the District
Court held that "the risks previously involved have increased
in magnitude even as new risks are being added." I d., at
260.
The Court of Appeals examined the medical evidence in the
record and found that respondent would suffer some risks
associated with the surgical procedure. 7
One surgeon had
testified that the difficulty of discovering the exact location of
the bullet "could require extensive probing and retracting of
the muscle tissue," carrying with it "the concomitant risks of
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood
vessels and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity." 717
F. 2d, at 900. The court further noted that "the greater
intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infection." Ibid. Moreover, there was conflict in the testimony
concerning the nature and the scope of the operation. One
surgeon stated that it would take 15-20 minutes, while
another predicted the procedure could take up to two and
one-half hours. Ibid. The court properly took the resulting
uncertainty about the medical risks into account. 8
312, 316 (1976) (en bane) , cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v.
, 453 A. 2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1982).
7
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that "the specific physical
risks from putting [respondent] under general anesthesia may be considered minimal." 717 F . 2d, at 900. Testimony had shown that "the general risks of harm or death~ general anesthesia are quite low, and that
[respondent] was in the statistical group of persons with the lowest risk of
injury from general anesthesia." Ibid.
8
One expert testified that this would be "minor" surgery. See App.
99. The question whether the surgery is to be characterized in medical

Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, -

1'("
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Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of
a general anesthetic, would be a severe intrusion on respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring
general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive.
In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own
will concerning the patient's body and the patient's right to
privacy is therefore preserved. In this case, however, the
Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth proposes to
take control of respondent's body, to "drug the citizen-not
yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness," 717 F. 2d, ~901,
and then to search beneath his skin for evidence of ~rime.
This kind of surgery, which involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing
beneath his skin, is an extremely severe intrusion.
The other part of tlie oa ce co cerns t e Commonwealth's need to intrude into respondent's body to retrieve
the bullet. The Commonwealth claims to need the bullet to
demonstrate that it was fired from Watkinson's gun, which in
turn would show that respondent was the robber who confronted Watkinson. However, although we recognize the
difficulty of making determinations in advance as to the
strength of the case against respondent, petitioners' assertions of a compelling need for the bullet are hardly persuasive. The very circumstances relied on in this case to demonstrate probable cause to believe that evidence will be found
tend to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel respondent to undergo surgery. The Commonwealth has available
terms as "major" or "minor" is not controlling. We agree with the Court
of Appeals and the District Court in this case that "there is no reason to
suppose that the definition of a medical term of art should coincide with the
parameters of a constitutional standard." 551 F. Supp., at 160 (quoted at
717 F. 2d, at 901); accord, State v. Overstreet, 551 S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo.
1977). This does not mean that the application of medical concepts in such
cases is to be ignored. However, no specific medical categorization can
control the multi-faceted legal inquiry that the court must undertake.

u_

J
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~ ~>

~

~ ki~
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substantial additional evidence that respondent was the individual who accosted Watkinson on the night of the robbery.
No party in this case suggests that Watkinson's entirely
spontaneous identification of respondent at the hospital
would be inadmissible. In addition, petitioners can no doubt
prove that Watkinson was found a few blocks from
Watkinson's store shortly after the incident took place. And
the Commonwealth can certainly show that the location of
the bullet (under respondent's left collarbone) seems to correlate with Watkinson's report that the robber "jerked" to the
--left. App. 13. The fact that the Commonwealth has available~stanthiDevidence of the origin of the bullet
~ restricts the need for the State to compel respondent
to undergo the contemplated surgery. 9
In weighin the various factors in this case, we therefore
reach e same conclusion as t e courts below. The operation sough will m ru e su s antla y on espondent's protected interests. The medical risks of the operation, althou h pparently not extremely severe, are a subject of
conside ble dispute; the very uncertainty militates against
There are also some questions concerning the probative value of the
bullet, even if it could be retrieved. The evidentiary value of the bullet
depends on a comparison between markings, if any, on the bullet in ree--tspondent's shoulder and markings, if any, found on a test bullet that_t_h.;...
police could fire from Watkinson's gun. However, the record su rts
some doubt whether this kind of comparison is possibl~
IS IS ec
the bullet's markings may have been corroded in the time that the bullet
has been in respondent's shoulder, thus making it useless for comparison
purposes. See 717 F . 2d, at 901, n. 15. In addition, respondent argues
that any given gun may be incapable of firing bullets that have a consistent
set of markings. SeeR. J. Joling, An Overview of Firearms Identification
Evidence for Attorneys I: Salient Features of Firearms Evidence, 26 J.
Forensic Sci. 153, 154 (1981). The record is devoid of any evidence that
the police have attempted to test-fire Watkinson's gun, and there thus
remains the additional possibility that a comparison of bullets is impossible
because Watkinson's gun does not consistently fire bullets with the same
markings. However, because the courts below made no findings on this
point, we hesitate to give it significant weight in our analysis.
9
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finding the operation to be "reasonable." In addition, the
intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the
operation can only be characterized as extremel?'Severe.
On the other hand, although the bullet may turn out to be
useful to the Commonwealth in prosecuting respondent, the
Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a com ellin need
for it. We believe that m these · c
ances t e om~
wealth has failed to demonstrate that it would be "reasonable" under the terms of the Fourth Amendment to search
for evidence of this crime by means of the contemplated
surgery.
IV
The Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of
the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Where the Court has found a lesser expectation
of privacy, see, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128 (1978);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), or where
the search involves a minimal intrusion on privacy interests,
see, e. g., United States v. Hensley, - - U. S. - - (1985);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210-211 (1979);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are correspondingly less stringent. Conversely, however, the Fourth Amendment's command that
searches be "reasonable" requires that when the State seeks
to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial
justification is required to make the search "reasonable."
Applying these principles, we hold that the proposed search
in this case would be "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
Affirmed.
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,Jqn"tmt
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 12, 1985

No. 83-1334

Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill,
.If you would be willing to omit the citation
to Tennessee v. Garner on p. 5, I would be pleased to
join the 2nd Draft of your opinion.
~

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

. ·,

of tltt lfuittb .jtatt.e'
JlagJrington. ~. Of. 21lc?'!~

~n:p-rtmt C!fonri

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

February 12, 1985

83-1334 - Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill,
I find that I can go along with your 2nd
draft in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.iu,rmtt C!f.rurt of tift ~b .ttatt•
~..~ J. Clf. 20~'!~
CHAMI!IERS Of'"

.JUSTICE

w... .J.

eRENNAN, .JR .

February 13, 1985

No. 83-1334
Winston v. Lee

Dear Sandra,
Thank you very much for your note.
Of course I' 11 delete the citation you
mentioned.

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

.ftt¥rtm.t <J1llttd of t4t ~ittb .fbdt.&'

11ta,gltlngton, Jl. <J1.

2llc?~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 14, 1985

No. 83-1334

Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 02/15/85
M'F:MORANOUM
TO:

Lynda

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

Feb. 15, 1985

83-1334 Winston v. Lee

As you will see, I have substantially reframed

your draft of a letter to Justice Brennan, but relied on the
basic points that you so correctly make.
Pleas~

dictated draft.

feel free to improve the language in my
I

would like to get this circulated as

promotly as we can before other. people ioin Bill Brennan.
know that Elizabeth has required your attention today.

I

Per-

haps we could get this letter out tomorrow, even though it
is Saturday.

For example, you can send material to me by

having the Marshal's office - that ts the police - use a
Court car to brinq it down to me at my request, if it should
be inconvenient for one of you to drop it off at the

qatehouse.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.fltJTttntt <!fouri &tf tlrt ~tb' .ftRits
jlhts frington. ~. <!f. 21T,?)l. ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

February 16, 1985

No. 83-1334 Winston v. Lee
Dear Bill:
I was not able until yesterday to read the draft
op1n1ons that have circulated in this important case. Your
second draft comes quite close to an opinion that I could
join. I do have concerns, however, that I outline briefly.
1. I thought the Court agreed that we would apply
the Schmerber balancing test, and much of your opinion purports to do this. It seems to me, however, that certainly
language in the opinion will be read as imposing a substantially heavier burden on the state whenever a surgical procedure is involved - a burden shifting that can be read as
departing from the basic balancing that is the centerpiece
of Schmerber.

For example, on p. 1 you state that "the procedure
sought here is an example of the 'more substantial intrusion' cautioned against in Schmerber, and consequently [we]
hold that to permit the procedure would violate respondent's
[Fourth Amendment rights] • • • • • I am afraid this language could be read - in light of other language in the
opinion - as indicating a blanket disapproval of almost any
surgical procedure or at least a strong presumption against
its validity. This would be a departure from the Schmerber
requirement that a Court should consider all of the relevant
facts and circumstances.
With respect to this sentence on p. 1, deleting
the word "consequently" would eliminate the implication that
a surgical procedure - any surgical procedure - necessarily
imposes a different balancing than Schmerber.
2. Your opinion emphasizes that the procedure is
conducted without the respondent's consent. But will this
not always be true? Otherwise, there would be no case.
One interesting point in this case is that it
could be argued, I suppose, that respondent's strong opposition prompted the evidence that a general anesthetic was
desirable simply to make certain that respondent could be
counted on to remain perfectly still during the procedure.

2.

3. In several places in your opinion language is
modified by the use of "extremely" and "severely" (e.g., p.
11, lines 2, 17~ p. 12, line 12~ p. 13, line 2). use of
this language contributes to what seems to me to be the
overall tone of the opinion that ~surgical procedure
places the case in a different context from the Schmerber
balancing of all relevant facts and circumstances.
In sum, Bill, I view this as an extremely close
case. If the State of Virginia had shown a compelling need
for the evidence, the balance very well could have shifted
the other way. It does not seem to me that your opinion
emphasizes sufficiently that the issue in a case of this
kind necessarily involves a weighing of all relevant facts
and circumstances. The term "surgical procedure" embraces
everything that may require the use of a surgical instrument. The term would embrace, for example, everything from
removing a small splinter to the type of surgery I experienced out at Mayo. I think my concerns expressed above
would require only the most modest changes in your opinion.
If you are inclined to make them, I will be happy to join.
If not, I probably will write separately.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc: The Conference

l'uvrtnu <lJltmt ltf tlft ~b .itatu
'lla.sfringhm, ~.

OJ.

21l,;i){.~

CHAMI!SE:RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

February

Re:

19~

No. 83-1334-Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

d'Jt1·
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

., ....

The Conference

1985

CHAMBERS OF

February 19, 1985

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN , .JR.

No. 83-1334 -- Winston v. Lee

Dear Lewis:
Thanks for your letter of February 16.
I hope that the
following changes will take care of the issues you raised. Your
first suggested change will be made in the next draft.
With respect to your second point, however, I am a little
less sure what to do.
It seems to me that, although use of a
general anesthetic could become necessary in a case like this
because of the lack of cooperation of the suspect, this was not
what happened here. The parties do not seem to argue that this
was the purpose of the general anesthetic in this case, and the
Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he new surgeon decided that the
greater depth of the bullet required the use of general
anesthesia in the surgery." 717 F.2d, at 891. The testimony of
the surgeon was that it was up to the surgeon to decide whether
to use general anesthesia, J.A. 91, and that "it would be safer
to remove the bullet under general anesthesia," J .A. 83.
He
elaborated on this point at J.A. 91-92 and explained on J.A. 94
that the pain caused by the operation, even under a local
anesthetic,
may
cause
a
patient
to
"tighten up,"
which
consequently could make the operation "more difficult." Finally,
at J .A. 102-109, he resisted the suggestion that the general
anesthetic would be necessary because of respondent's lack of
cooperation.
In the light of all of this, it seems that the
general
anesthetic
is
necessary here for
"purely medical
reasons," as the opinion suggests on p. 11, line 2. See also p.
3, last line.
Would it resolve your doubts if I added the
following footnote to the passage on p. 11: "Somewhat different
issues would be raised if the use of a general anesthetic became
necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate.
Cf.
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super 25, 453 A.2d 556 (App. Div.
1982)."
With respect to your third point, I believe that I can make
the necessary changes. At the top of p. 11, the language merely
reports the lower courts' views. I would change this sentence to
read:
"Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of a

-2-

general
anesthetic,
would
be an
'extensive'
intrusion on
respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 717 F.2d, at
900."
In the middle of p. 11, I would modify the sentence to
read:
"This kind of surgery
involves a
virtually total
divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing
beneath his skin." On p. 12, I would omit the word "severely."
On p. 13, I would omit the word "extremely."
All of these
passages relate only to the particular facts of this case, and I
do not believe that, especially as modified, they suggest that
all forms of surgery ought to be treated similarly. The current
draft of the opinion explicitly employs a totality of the
circumstances "balancing" process. See, e.g., pp. 6, 7, 9, 12.
I hope that these changes are satisfactory.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~U¥rtnu

<qaurt #£ t4t JnUtb ~tab.e'
JlU'Ifingtou, Jl. cq. 2llbi,.~

CHAMBE:RS OF

.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 19, 1985

Re:

83-1334

Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill,
I have read Lewis' suggestions in this
case and I, for one, think they would be helpful.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.•.

February 20, 1985

83-1334 Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill:
In light of the chanqes indicated in your letter
of February 17, I will be happy to ioin your opinion.
changes.

I appreciate your willingness to make these
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

,.,. '

.i'uprmu QJ#Url of tl(~~ .ll.tat~•
,rulfinglDn, ~. QJ. 20~~
CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 21, 1985

Re:

83-1334 - Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill:
After further reflection, I have decided to
withdraw my separate concurrence and simply join your
opinion as revised to accommodate Lewis' suggestions.

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.9u.vrtuu QIDUri .of t4t Jnittb' .9tatt.8'
)lultiqton, J. <II· 2Jtc?"~
CHAMBE:RS Of"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 12, 1985

No. 83-1334

Winston and Davis v. Lee

Dear Bill,
If you would be willing to omit the citation
to Tennessee v. Garner on p. 5, I would be pleased to
join the 2nd Draft of your opinion.
~

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

.ju.prnnt (!fonri of tltt 'Jnitt.b .i\talt.eJiuJrin:gtott. ~. at. 21lbi~~
C HAMBER S 0 F

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

February 12, 1985

83-1334 - Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill,
I find that I can go along with your 2nd
draft in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

.fuprtmt <IJ~tnrl &tf tift ~b .ftatt•
,.-u~ J. <IJ. 2ll~~~
CHAMISE:RS 01'"

.JUSTICE Wtc . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

February 13, 1985

No. 83-1334
Winston v. Lee

Dear Sandra,
Thank you very much for your note.
Of course I' 11 delete the citation you
mentioned.
Since~Jely,

h

../

' 1

~.~t

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 14, 1985

No. 83-1334

Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss 02/15/85

LEEl SALLY-POW
83-1334 Winston v. Lee

Dear Bill:
I was not able until yesterday to read the draft
+M.t

opinions ~

have circulated in this important case.

Your

second draft comes quite close to an opinion that I could
join.

I do have concerns, however, that I outline

briefly.
1.

I thought the Court agreed that we would

apply the Schmerber balancing test, and much of your
opinion purports to do this.

It seems to me, however,

that certainly language in the opinion will be read as
imposing a substantially heavier burden on the state
whenever a surgical procedure is involved - a burden

shifting that can be read as departing from the basic
balancing that is the centerpiece of Schmerber.
For example, on p. 1 you state that "the
procedure sought here is an example of ,the 'more
substantial intrusion' cautioned against in Schmerber, and
consequently [we]

would violate

hold ~

that to permit the procedure

respondent's ~ourth Amendment right~~

I am afraid this language could be read -

n

in light of

other language in the opinion - as indicating a blanket
disapproval of almost any

~W'"C\ i c.o. \

me &is~

procedure or at least a

strong presumption against its validity.

This would be a

departure from the Schmerber requirement that a Court
should consider all of the relevant facts and
circumstances.

With respect to this sentence on p. 1, deleting
the word "consequently" would eliminate the implication
that a surgical procedure - any surgical procedure necessarily imposes a different balancing than Schmerber.
2.

Your opinion emphasizes that the procedure

is conducted without the respondent's consent.
not always be true?

~

ButAthis

Otherwise, there would be no case.

One interesting point in this case is that it
could be argued, I suppose, that respondent's strong
opposition prompted the evidence that a general

a~thetic

was desirable simply to make certain that respondent could
be counted on to remain perfectly still during the
pro9edure.
3.

In several places in your opinion language

is modified by the use of "extremely" and "severely"

(e.g., p. 11, lines 2, 17: p. 12, line 12: p. 13, line 2) •
Use of this language contributes to what seems to me to be
the overall tone of the opinion that

~surgical

procedure places the case in a different context from the
Schmerber balancing of all relevant facts and
circumstances.
In sum, Bill, I view this as an extremely close
case.

If the 3 tate of Virginia had shown a compelling
::::::0

need for the evidence, the balance very well could have
shifted the other way.

It does not seem to me that your

opinion emphasizes sufficiently that the issue in a case
of this kind necessarily involves a weighing of all
relevant facts and circumstances.

procedure• embraces

ev~~ing

a surgical instrument.

The term "surgical

that may require the use of

The term would embrace, for

example, everything from removing a small splinter to the
type of surgery I experienced out at Mayo.

I think my

concerns expressed above would require only the most
modest changes in your opinion.

If you are inclined to

make them, I will be happy to join.
will write separately.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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February 19, 1985

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

No. 83-1334 -- Winston v. Lee

Dear Lewis:
Thanks for your letter of February 16.
I hope that the
following changes will take care of the issues you raised. Your
first suggested change will be made in the next draft.
With respect to your second point, however, I am a little
less sure what to do.
It seems to me that, although use of a
general anesthetic could become necessary in a case like this
because of the lack of cooperation of the suspect, this was not
what happened here. The parties do not seem to argue that this
was the purpose of the general anesthetic in this case, and the
Court of Appeals stated that "[t)he new surgeon decided that the
greater depth of the bullet required the use of general
anesthesia in the surgery." 717 F.2d, at 891. The testimony of
the surgeon was that it was up to the surgeon to decide whether
to use general anesthesia, J.A. 91, and that "it would be safer
to remove the bullet under general anesthesia," J .A. 83.
He
elaborated on this point at J.A. 91-92 and explained on J.A. 94
that the pain caused by the operation, even under a local
anesthetic,
may
cause
a
patient
to
"tighten up,"
which
consequently could make the operation "more difficult." Finally,
at J .A. 102-109, he resisted the suggestion that the general
anesthetic would be necessary because of respondent's lack of
cooperation.
In the light of all of this, it seems that the
general
anesthetic
is
necessary here for
"purely medical
reasons," as the opinion suggests on p. 11, line 2. See also p.
3, last line.
Would it resolve your doubts if I added the
following footnote to the passage on p. 11: "Somewhat different
issues would be raised if the use of a general anesthetic became
necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate.
Cf.
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super 25, 453 A.2d 556 (App. Div.
1982)."
With respect to your third point, I believe that I can make
the necessary changes. At the top of p. 11, the language merely
reports the lower courts' views. I would change this sentence to
read:
"Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of a
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 83-1334

ANDREW J. WINSTON, SHERIFF AND AUBREY
M. DAVIS, JR., PETITIONERS v.
RUDOLPH LEE, JR.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1985]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), held inter
alia that a State may, over the suspect's protest, have a physician extract blood from a person suspected of drunk driving
without violation of the suspect's right secured by the Fourth
Amendment not to be subjected to unreasonable searches
and seizures. However, Schmerber cautioned "That we
today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States
minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions."
I d., at 772. In this case, the Commonwealth of Virginia
seeks to compel the respondent Rudolph Lee, who is suspected of attempting to commit armed robbery, to undergo a
surgical procedure under a general anesthetic for removal of
a bullet lodged in his chest. The Commonwealth alleges that
the bullet will provide evidence of respondent's guilt or innocence. We conclude that the procedure sought here is an example of the "more substantial intrusion" cautioned against in
Schmerber,
and hold that to permit the procedure would vio)
late respondent's right to be "secure in [his] person" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
~
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I
A

At approximately 1:00 a. m. on July 18, 1982, Ralph E.
Watkinson was closing his shop for the night. As he was
locking the door, he observed someone armed with a gun
coming toward him from across the street. Watkinson was
also armed and when he drew his gun, the other person told
him to freeze. Watkinson then fired at the other person,
who returned his fire. Watkinson was hit in the legs, while
the other individual, who appeared to be wounded in his left
side, ran from the scene. The police arrived on the scene
shortly thereafter, and Watkinson was taken by ambulance
to the emergency room of the Medical College of Virginia
(MCV) Hospital.
Approximately 20 minutes later, police officers responding
to another call found respondent eight blocks from where the
earlier shooting occurred. Respondent was suffering from a
gunshot wound to his left chest area and told the police that
he had been shot when two individuals attempted to rob him.
An ambulance took respondent to the MCV Hospital.
Watkinson was still in the MCV emergency room and, when
respondent entered that room, said "[T]hat's the man that
shot me." App. 14. After an investigation, the police
decided that respondent's story of having been himself the
victim of a robbery was untrue and charged respondent with
attempted robbery, malicious wounding, and two counts of
using a firearm in the commission of a felony.
B

The Commonwealth shortly thereafter moved in State
court for an order directing respondent to undergo surgery to
remove an object thought to be a bullet lodged under his left
collarbone. The court conducted several evidentiary hearings on the motion. At the first hearing, the Commonwealth's expert testified that the surgical procedure would
take 45 minutes and would involve a three to four percent
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chance of temporary nerve damage, a one percent chance of
permanent nerve damage, and a one-tenth of one percent
chance of death. At the second hearing, the expert testified
that on re-examination of respondent, he discovered that the
bullet was not "back inside close to the arteries," App. 52, as
he originally had thought. Instead, he now believed the bullet to be located "just beneath the skin." App. 57. He testified that the surgery would require an incision of only one
and one-half centimeters (slightly more than one-half inch),
could be performed under local anesthesia, and would result
in "no danger on the basis that there's no general anesthesia
employed." App. 51.
The state trial judge granted the motion to compel surgery. Respondent petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court
for a writ of prohibition and/or a writ of habeas corpus, both
of which were denied. Respondent then brought an action in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to enjoin the pending operation on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court refused to issue a preliminary injunction, holding that respondent's cause had little likelihood
of success on the merits. 551 F. Supp. 247, 247-253 (1982). 1
On October 18, 1982, just before the surgery was scheduled, the surgeon ordered that X-rays be taken of respondent's chest. The X-rays revealed that the bullet was in fact
lodged two and one-half to three centimeters (approximately
one inch) deep in muscular tissue in respondent's chest, substantially deeper than had been thought when the state court
granted the motion to compel surgery. The surgeon now believed that a general anesthetic would be desirable for medical reasons.
Respondent's action in the District Court was styled as a petition for
habeas corpus and an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a preliminary injunction. Because the District Court denied the relief sought, it found it
unnecessary to consider whether res judicata, see Allen v. McCurry, 449
U. S. 90 (1980), would bar consideration of the§ 1983 claim. 551 F. Supp.,
at 252, n. 4.
1
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Respondent moved the state trial court for a rehearing
based on the new evidence. After holding an evidentiary
hearing, the state trial court denied the rehearing and the
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. Respondent then returned to federal court, where he moved to alter or amend
the judgment previously entered against him. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court enjoined the threatened
surgery. 551 F. Supp. 247, 253-261 (ED Va. 1982) (supplemental opinion). 2 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 717 F. 2d 888 (1984). 3 We
• Respondent had moved to reopen the petition for habeas corpus, as
well as to alter or amend the judgment. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
petition for habeas on the ground that respondent was not at that time "in
custody'' for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2241. The District Court rejected
this contention, holding that habeas was available because petitioner was
objecting to a future custody that would take place when the operation was
to be performed. 247 F. Supp., at 257-259. The Court of Appeals held
that respondent's claim was cognizable only under § 1983. 717 F. 2d, at
893 (1983). Respondent has not cross-petitioned for review of this holding, and it is therefore not before us.
8
The Fourth Circuit held that Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980),
did not bar respondent's attempt to relitigate in federal court the same
Fourth Amendment issues previously litigated in state court. The court
agreed with the District Court's conclusion, see 551 F. Supp., at 258-259,
that respondent had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the
state trial court. 717 F. 2d, at 895-899. Respondent filed his motion for
rehearing in state court on October 18, the day he was informed of the
changed circumstances regarding the removal of the bullet. On October
19, the state court ordered an evidentiary hearing to be held on October 21.
The Court of Appeals was "satisfied from the record that counsel was not
able, despite obviously diligent effort, to obtain an independent review of
the medical record by outside physicians nor was he able to consult with
the independent expert in anesthesiology in order to prepare a presentation on the risks of general anesthesia." I d., at 897. Yet, despite the crucial nature of the medical evidence, the state court refused to grant
respondent's repeated request for a continuance. Because "[t]he arbitrary
truncation of preparation time deprived [respondent] of a fair opportunity
to determine the crucial factors relevant to his claim and to obtain independent expert witnesses to testify about these factors," 717 F. 2d, at
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granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1984), to consider
whether a State may consistently with the Fourth Amendment compel a suspect to undergo surgery of this kind in a
search for evidence of a crime.
II
The Fourth Amendment protects "expectations of privacy," see Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1968)-the
individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places and
at certain times he has "the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Putting to one side the
procedural protections of the warrant requirement, the
Fourth Amendment generally protects the "security" of "persons, houses, papers and effects" against official intrusions up
to the point where the community's need for evidence surmounts a specified standard, ordinarily "probable cause."
Beyond this point, it is ordinarily justifiable for the community to demand that the individual give up some part of his
interest in privacy and security to advance the community's
vital interests in law enforcement; such a search is generally
"reasonable" in the Amendment's terms.
A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and
security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be "unreasonable" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime. In
Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757 (1966), we addressed
a claim that the State had breached the Fourth Amendment's
protection of the "right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures" (emphasis added) when it compelled an individual suspected of
drunk driving to undergo a blood test. Schmerber had been
arrested at a hospital while receiving treatment for injuries
898-899, the Court of Appeals refused to grant preclusive effect to the
state court's findings. Petitioner does not challenge this ruling.
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suffered when the automobile he was driving struck a tree.
Despite Schmerber's objection, a police officer
at the hospital had directed a physician to take a blood sample
from him. Schmerber subsequently objected to the introduction at trial of evidence obtained as a result of the blood
test.
The authorities in Schmerber clearly had probable cause to
believe that he had been driving while intoxicated, id.' at
768, and to believe that a blood test would provide evidence
that was exceptionally probative in confirming this belief.
I d., at 770. Because the case fell within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant
was necessary. Ibid. The search was not more intrusive
than reasonably necessary to accomplish its goals. Nonetheless, Schmerber argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the authorities from intruding into his body to extract
the blood that was needed as evidence.
Schmerber noted that "[t]he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." I d., at
767. Citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949), and
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we observed that these
values were "basic to a free society." We also noted that
"[b]ecause we are dealing with intrusions into the human
body rather than with state interferences with property relationships or private papers-'houses, papers, and effects'we write on a clean slate." 384 U. S., at 767-768. The intrusion perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and
deep-rooted expectations of privacy, and the Court recognized that Fourth Amendment analysis thus required a discerning inquiry into the facts and circumstances to determine
whether the intrusion was justifiable. The Fourth Amendment neither forbids nor permits all such intrusions; rather,
the Amendment's "proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against those intrusions
Id., at 758.
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which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are
made in an improper manner." Id., at 768.
The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's
interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case,
the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate
one admitting of few categorical answers. We believe that
Schmerber, however, provides the appropriate framework of
analysis for such cases.
Schmerber recognized that the ordinary requirements of
the Fourth Amendment would be the threshold requirements
for conducting this kind of surgical search and seizure. We
noted the importance of probable cause. Id., at 768-769.
And we pointed out that "[s]earch warrants are ordinarily
required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the
human body are concerned.... The importance of informed,
detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether
or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt
is indisputable and great." /d., at 770.
Beyond these standards, Schmerber's inquiry considered a
number of other factors in determining the "reasonableness"
of the blood test. A crucial factor in analyzing the magnitude of the intrusion in Schmerber is the extent to which the
procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual. "[F]or most people [a blood test] involves virtually no
risk, trauma, or pain." Ibid. Moreover, all reasonable
medical precautions were taken and no unusual or untested
procedures were employed in Schmerber; "the procedure was
performed by medical technicians in a hospital environment
according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. Notwithstanding the existence of probable cause, a search for evi-

I
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dence of a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life
or health of the suspect. 4
Another factor is the extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity. Intruding into an individual's living room, see Payton
v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (1980), eavesdropping upon an
individual's telephone conversations, see Katz v. United
States, 389 U. S. 347, 361 (1968), or forcing an individual to
accompany police officers to the police station, see Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U. S. 200 (1979), typically do not injure the
physical person of the individual. Such intrusions do, however, damage the individual's sense of personal privacy and
security and are thus subject to the Fourth Amendment's
dictates. In noting that a blood test was "a commonplace in
these days of periodic physical examinations," 384 U. S., at
771, Schmerber recognized society's judgment that blood
tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an
individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 5
• Numerous courts have recognized the crucial importance of this factor.
See, e. g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S. W. 2d 879, 882 (1974)
(refusing to order surgery because of medical risk); People v. Smith, 80
Misc. 2d 210, 362 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (same); State v. Allen,
277 S. C. 595, 291 S. E. 2d 459 (1982) (same); see also Lee v. Winston, 717
F. 2d 888, 900 (CA41983); id., at 905-908 (Widener, J., dissenting); United
States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d 312, 316 (1976)
(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551
S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo. 1977) (en bane). See generally Note, 68 Marquette
L. Rev. 130, 135 (1984) (discussing cases involving bodily intrusions); Note,
60 Notre Dame Law Review 149, 152-156 (1984) (same); Note, 55 Texas L.
Rev. 147 (1976) (same).
5
See also Schmerber, 384 U.S, at 771 ("The blood test has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those going into the military
service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting entrance and literally millions of us have
voluntarily gone through the same, though a longer, routine in becoming
blood donors") (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U. S. 432, 436 (1957)).
The degree of intrusion in Schmerber was minimized as well by the fact
that a blood test "involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain," 384 U. S., at
771, and by the fact that the blood test was conducted "in a hospital envi-
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Weighed against these individual interests is the community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or
innocence. This interest is of course of great importance.
We noted in Schmerber that a blood test is "a highly effective
means of determining the degree to which a person is under
the influence of alcohol." I d., at 771. Moreover, there was
"a clear indication that in fact [desired] evidence [would]
be found" if the blood test were undertaken. I d., at 770.
Especially given the difficulty of proving drunkenness by
other means, these considerations showed that results of the
blood test were of vital importance if the State were to enforce its drunk driving laws. In Schmerber, we concluded
that this State interest was sufficient to justify the intrusion,
and the compelled blood test was thus "reasonable" for
Fourth Amendment purposes.

III
Applying the Schmerber balancing test in this case, we believe that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result.
The Commonwealth plainly had probable cause to conduct
the search. In addition, all parties apparently agree that
respondent has had a full measure of procedural protections
and has been able fully to litigate the difficult medical and
legal questions necessarily involved in analyzing the reasonableness of a surgical incision of this magnitude. 6 Our
ronment according to accepted medical practices." Ibid. As such, the
procedure in Schmerber contrasted sharply with the practice in Rochin v.
California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), in which police officers broke into a suspect's room, attempted to extract narcotics capsules he had put into his
mouth, took him to a hospital, and directed that an emetic be·administered
to induce vomiting. Id., at 166. Rochin, recognizing the individual's interest in "human dignity," id., at 174, held the search and seizure unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.
8
Because the State has afforded respondent the benefit of a full adversary presentation and appellate review, we do not reach the question
whether the State may compel a suspect to undergo a surgical search of
this magnitude for evidence absent such special procedural protections.
Cf. United States v. Crowder, 177 U. S. App. D. C. 165, 169, 543 F. 2d

l
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inquiry therefore must focus on the extent of the intrusion on
respondent's privacy interests and on the state's need for the
evidence.
The threats to the health or safety of respondent posed by
the surgery are the subject of sharp dispute between the parties. Before the new revelations of October 18, the District
Court found that the procedure could be carried out "with
virtually no risk to [respondent]." 551 F. Supp., at 252. On
rehearing, however, with new evidence before it, the District
Court held that "the risks previously involved have increased
in magnitude even as new risks are being added." I d., at
260.
The Court of Appeals examined the medical evidence in the
record and found that respondent would suffer some risks
associated with the surgical procedure. 7
One surgeon had
testified that the difficulty of discovering the exact location of
the bullet "could require extensive probing and retracting of
the muscle tissue," carrying with it "the concomitant risks of
injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood
vessels and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity." 717
F. 2d, at 900. The court further noted that "the greater
intrusion and the larger incisions increase the risks of infection." Ibid. Moreover, there was conflict in the testimony
concerning the nature and the scope of the operation. One
surgeon stated that it would take 15-20 minutes, while
another predicted the procedure could take up to two and
one-half hours. Ibid. The court properly took the resulting
uncertainty about the medical risks into account. 8
312, 316 (1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1062 (1977); State v.
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, - , 453 A. 2d 556, 558 (App. Div. 1982).
7
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that "the specific physical
risks from putting [respondent] under general anesthesia may be considered minimal." 717 F. 2d, at 900. Testimony had shown that "the general risks of harm or death from general anesthesia are quite low, and that
[respondent] was in the statistical group of persons with the lowest risk of
injury from general anesthesia." Ibid.
8
One expert testified that this would be "minor" surgery. See App.
99. The question whether the surgery is to be characterized in medical
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Both lower courts in this case believed that the proposed
surgery, which for purely medical reasons required the use of
a general anesthetic, 9 would be an "extensive" intrusion on
respondent's personal privacy and bodily integrity. 717 F.
2d, at 900. When conducted with the consent of the patient,
surgery requiring general anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive. In such a case, the surgeon is carrying out the patient's own will concerning the patient's body
and the patient's right to privacy is therefore preserved. In
this case, however, the Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth proposes to take control of respondent's body, to
"drug the citizen-not yet convicted of a criminal offensewith narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness," 717 F. 2d, at 901, and then to search beneath his skin
for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over
surgical probing beneath his skin.
The other part of the balance concerns the Commonwealth's need to intrude into respondent's body to retrieve
the bullet. The Commonwealth claims to need the bullet to
demonstrate that it was fired from Watkinson's gun, which in
turn would show that respondent was the robber who confronted Watkinson. However, although we recognize the
difficulty of making determinations in advance as to the
strength of the case against respondent, petitioners' assertions of a compelling need for the bullet are hardly persuasive. The very circumstances relied on in this case to dem-

I

tenns as "major" or "minor" is not controlling. We agree with the Court
of Appeals and the District Court in this case that ''there is no reason to
suppose that the definition of a medical tenn of art should coincide with the
parameters of a constitutional standard." 551 F. Supp., at 160 (quoted at
717 F. 2d, at 901); accord, State v. Overstreet, 551 S. W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo.
1977). This does not mean that the application of medical concepts in such
cases is to be ignored. However, no specific medical categorization can
control the multi-faceted legal inquiry that the court must undertake.
9
Somewhat different issues would be raised if the use of a general anesthetic became necessary because of the patient's refusal to cooperate. Cf.
State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A. 2d 556 (App. Div. 1982).
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onstrate probable cause to believe that evidence will be found
tend to vitiate the Commonwealth's need to compel respondent to undergo surgery. The Commonwealth has available
substantial additional evidence that respondent was the individual who accosted Watkinson on the night of the robbery.
No party in this case suggests that Watkinson's entirely
spontaneous identification of respondent at the hospital
would be inadmissible. In addition, petitioners can no doubt
prove that Watkinson was found a few blocks from Watkinson's store shortly after the incident took place. And the
Commonwealth can certainly show that the location of the
bullet (under respondent's left collarbone) seems to correlate
with Watkinson's report that the robber "jerked" to the left.
App. 13. The fact that the Commonwealth has available
such substantial evidence of the origin of the bullet restricts
the need for the State to compel respondent to undergo the
contemplated surgery. 10
In weighing the various factors in this case, we therefore
reach the same conclusion as the courts below. The operation sought will intrude substantially on respondent's proThere are also some questions concerning the probative value of the
bullet, even if it could be retrieved. The evidentiary value of the bullet
depends on a comparison between markings, if any, on the bullet in respondent's shoulder and markings, if any, found on a test bullet that the
police could fire from Watkinson's gun. However, the record suports
some doubt whether this kind of comparison is possible. This is because
the bullet's markings may have been corroded in the time that the bullet
has been in respondent's shoulder, thus making it useless for comparison
purposes. See 717 F. 2d, at 901, n. 15. In addition, respondent argues
that any given gun may be incapable of firing bullets that have a consistent
set of markings. SeeR. J. Joling, An Overview of Firearms Identification
Evidence for Attorneys I: Salient Features of Firearms Evidence, 26 J.
Forensic Sci. 153, 154 (1981). The record is devoid of any evidence that
the police have attempted to test-fire Watkinson's gun, and there thus
remains the additional possibility that a comparison of bullets is impossible
because Watkinson's gun does not consistently fire bullets with the same
markings. However, because the courts below made no findings on this
point, we hesitate to give it significant weight in our analysis.
10
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tected interests. The medical risks of the operation, although apparently not extremely severe, are a subject of
considerable dispute; the very uncertainty militates against
finding the operation to be "reasonable." In addition, the
intrusion on respondent's privacy interests entailed by the
operation can only be characterized as severe. On the other
hand, although the bullet may turn out to be useful to the
Commonwealth in prosecuting respondent, the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate a compelling need for it.
We believe that in these circumstances the Commonwealth
has failed to demonstrate that it would be "reasonable" under
the terms of the Fourth Amendment to search for evidence of
this crime by means of the contemplated surgery.
IV

The Fourth Amendment is a vital safeguard of the right of
the citizen to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into any area in which he has a reasonable expectation
of privacy. Where the Court has found a lesser expectation
of privacy, see, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 (1976), or where
the search involves a minimal intrusion on privacy interests,
see, e. g., United States v. Hensley, - - U. S. - - (1985);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 210-211 (1979);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are correspondingly less stringent. Conversely, however, the Fourth Amendment's command that
searches be "reasonable" requires that when the State seeks
to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly heightened privacy interest, a more substantial
justification is required to make the search "reasonable."
Applying these principles, we hold that the proposed search

I
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in this case would be "unreasonable" under the Fourth
Amendment.
Affirmed.
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